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A B S T R A C T   
This paper explores the social and political potential of accounting scholarship, presenting and 
discussing an intellectual intervention challenging a legislative reform that significantly affected 
Spanish industrial relations. In this reform, an accounting artifact (forecasted losses) played an 
unexpected role and was misrepresented, prompting a sizeable number of scholars to sign two 
manifestos in 2010 and 2012 against the use of forecasted losses made by the new legislation. As 
promoters of this manifesto, we perform in this paper a collaborative autoethnography to reflect 
on the context, events, reactions, and significance of this intervention for both the academic and 
the industrial relations fields. We mobilize Pierre Bourdieu’s ideas on the public intellectual to 
think more generally about academic engagements in the interplay between accounting, poli-
cymaking, and social issues. This intervention illustrates the different manners in which admin-
istrative and economic powers interfered in the Spanish accounting academic field, limiting the 
disposition of Spanish scholars to engage in public debates. We also interpret our engagement as 
mobilizing intellectual capital to expose how the notion of forecasted losses was used to produce a 
form of symbolic violence and how this capital is more effective as it produces messages 
addressed to the producers, i.e., policymakers and the judicature in this specific case.   
1. Introduction 
Interdisciplinary accounting researchers have adopted different theoretical approaches to explain not just the economic but also the 
social and political potential of accounting (Burchell et al., 1980; Cooper & Sherer, 1984; Parker, 2011). There is now a growing 
literature that inquires into the roles of accounting in different social and political arenas, both in the past and in the present. There has 
been, however, a comparatively lower interest in the investigation of the social and political role of accounting researchers, with some 
exceptions (Catchpowle & Smyth, 2016; Cooper & Coulson, 2014; Cooper et al., 2005; Haines-Doran, forthcoming; Neu et al., 2001). 
This limited attention is surprising considering the methodological standpoint adopted in interdisciplinary perspectives on ac-
counting. On the one hand, critical and interdisciplinary research has an anti-realist ontology and subjectivist epistemology, rendering 
the distinction between the research object and subject challenging, i.e., research activity is part of the social reality, and the generation 
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of accounting knowledge and ideas is very likely to have itself social and political potential. On the other hand, this absence is 
remarkable considering the attention that postmodern philosophers have paid to the role of intellectuals and how central this issue is, 
for example, in the controversies between followers of Sartre, Bourdieu, or Gramsci (Archel et al., 2011; Haines-Doran, forthcoming). 
The lack of attention to the social and political engagement of accounting researchers transpires in accounting journals, where the 
politics of accounting researchers are seldom discussed. Considering that Critical Perspectives on Accounting provides the opportunity to 
inquire about the social and political potential of accounting scholarship, we take this opportunity to present and discuss one of such 
events in which accounting scholars engaged in the discussion of a legislative reform that affected the labor relations of a whole 
country in significant ways. Two different governments, a social-democratic government in 2010 and a conservative government in 
2012, modified the regulation of industrial relations in Spain. The successive reforms consisted, among other aspects, in including the 
notion of forecasted losses as an objective cause for employment termination. These reforms used a particular articulation of accounting 
technologies to radically transform job security in Spain, motivating a substantial group of Spanish accounting scholars to sign two 
successive manifestos in 2010 and 2012 that the authors of this paper promoted. 
To examine this engagement event of the Spanish accounting scholars, this paper mobilizes Pierre Bourdieu’s ideas in social ac-
counting (Cooper & Coulson, 2014; Malsch et al., 2011; Neu et al., 2001). More specifically, this paper is interested in Bourdieu’s 
(2000a) understanding of the public intellectual, i.e., “researchers who intervene in the political world” (p. 40) and the insights the 
notion of the public intellectual can provide in the context of academic engagements in the interplay between accounting, policy-
making, and social issues. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The second section briefly reviews Bourdieu’s notion of the public intellectual. The 
third section describes the methods employed to analyze the forecasted losses intervention. While section four sets the scene describing 
the field of industrial relations in Spain, section five describes the reform elements, singularly how the introduction of the forecasted 
losses exception prompted the intervention of accounting scholars. Section six provides the rationale and an insider interpretation of 
the two subsequent manifestos, and section seven analyzes the different responses that these interventions elicited in both fields. 
Finally, the eighth section provides some discussion and concluding comments. 
2. Intellectual interventions 
This paper is an exercise of reflexivity about the ‘forecasted losses’ intervention informed by Bourdieu’s ideas on the intellectual 
engagements in public affairs (Bourdieu, 2000a; Bourdieu, 2000b; Malsch et al., 2011; Neu et al., 2001). Three central elements 
conform to Bourdieu’s theory of practice: field, habitus, and capital. First, Bourdieu conceives social life as a struggle to occupy po-
sitions in the social space (field) that also involves defining the relative value of different forms of capital. Fields have their own 
unquestioned rules of the game, which he calls illusio. Those rules are taken for granted due to the existence of a set of shared beliefs 
about the game, i.e., doxa. 
Second, individuals engage in the field struggle intentionally. However, their agency is somehow shaped by “structural limits” and 
by the “perceptions, aspirations and practices” that are generated by habitus that, in turn, “derives from the class-specific experiences of 
socialization in family and peer groups” (Swartz, 2003, pp. 102–103). This way, Bourdieu finds a balance between pure structuralism, 
where actors would be conceived as mere norms followers, and sheer voluntarism, where actors are conceived to deploy their agency 
to make free choices. For Bourdieu, agency is simultaneously strategic and limited, responding to opportunities and constraints ac-
cording to what he calls dispositions (Swartz, 2003). 
Finally, the existence of fields requires actors with the appropriate habitus and disposition to participate in those fields and invest 
their capital in the competition to occupy central positions in the field. Capital refers not only to resources but also to the relative value 
of those resources in the field, noting that such relative value is also subject to competition. 
Researchers and academia are but a particular case of those fields and can be studied by reference to the general rules of the field 
(Bourdieu, 2000b). Engaging in scientific fields requires the scientific capital that allows intellectual competition as well as a specific 
habitus permitting the scholastic disposition “that is able to bracket from immediate concern the needs of everyday existence in order to 
work with ideas” (Swartz, 2003, p. 233), suspending the urgencies of common sense and creating the propensity to invest in the 
academic game (illusio) (Bourdieu, 2000b). By suspending the urgencies of everyday existence and focusing on the academic game, the 
scholastic disposition creates a propensity to build ivory towers, distancing researchers from public affairs. Nevertheless, in Bourdieu 
(2000a), the intellectual has an imperative to engage with public affairs, to “transcend the sacred boundary inscribed in their mind (…) 
to enter into sustained and vigorous exchange with the outside world” (p. 44). This intellectual imperative is consistent with the critical 
accounting project because it aims at exposing “the invisible but scientifically predictable consequences of political measures inspired 
by neoliberal philosophy” (p. 45). To avoid the problems generated by distant academic fields and achieve a genuine intellectual 
intervention, Bourdieu contends that rigorous research needs to engage in reflexivity to recognize how the social situatedness of our 
academic disposition affects research (Bourdieu, 2000a; Swartz, 1997). 
A different set of problems concerning researchers’ autonomy arises at the intersection between intellectual fields and other fields. 
As mentioned above, the relative value of the different forms of capital is a matter of field struggle. Among the different forms of 
capital, symbolic capital consists of cognitive structures to which actors are blinded because it has a taken-for-granted nature 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Symbolic capital results in symbolic violence because “the dominated accept as legitimate their own 
condition of domination” (Swartz, 1997, p. 89). All forms of power require legitimation, and economic and cultural capital frequently 
obtain legitimation by a transformation into symbolic capital, producing symbolic violence (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Such 
transformation is produced by those who work with ideas and language and, in this regard, intellectual interventions present a tension 
between the aim of shattering symbolic violence by exposing how different capitals disguise their conversion into symbolic capital and 
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the likelihood that the intellectual intervention could produce precisely the opposite effect, i.e., transforming “relations of exploitation 
into legitimate relations” (Swartz, 1997, p. 93). For this reason, Bourdieu is a sharp defender of intellectual freedom and autonomy and 
a critic of administrative power, economic capital, and any form of external interference in intellectual production, including uni-
versity factions that limit the free flow of ideas, as well as any form of subordination to the means of intellectual production (Swartz, 
1997). 
3. Method 
Bearing in mind that the aim of this paper is to reflect on an intervention that the authors led, we consider that an account of our 
own experiences, as intervening researchers, is a substantial part of the analysis. As a research approach, autoethnography system-
atically analyzes and describes the researcher’s personal experience (Ellis et al., 2010) and has been used in accounting (e.g. Haynes, 
2013). However, in contrast with most autoethnographic studies, our experience is collective in nature. Therefore, we designed a 
collaborative autoethnography strategy. Collaborative autoethnography (Hernandez et al., 2017) is an “autoethnography that engages 
two or more autoethnographers in a research team to pool their lived experiences” (p. 251) 
Collaborative autoethnography promotes autoethnographic research’s trustworthiness by allowing for the intersubjective dis-
cussion and contradiction of the multiple sources derived from personal experiences (Hernandez et al., 2017). Hernandez et al. contend 
that the logistical (e.g., geographical), relational and ethical challenges of collaborative autoethnography are better managed by 
advanced planning. Consequently, a limitation of this study is that autoethnography was only considered when the time had already 
passed since the events reported in this article. To cope with this limitation, insights for this autoethnography drew from several 
bilateral and collective conversations over the years, the exchange of different relevant documents that one of the authors meticulously 
stored, as well as the exchange of different drafts upon which new collective observations emerged. The events that took place on the 
occasion of this intervention, and the conversations with colleagues in accounting and other disciplines, politicians, journalists, and 
judges, among others, have meant a lot to us. We, therefore, have a vivid memory of many events and conversations, which we 
contrasted among us when conducting the analysis for this article. Some perceptions emerging from this analysis are included in 
section seven through representative quotes extracted from our dialogues to represent such collaborative autoethnographic 
conversations. 
We complemented this collaborative autoethnography by analyzing documents related to the intervention, including drafts 
elaborated by the authors, emails exchanged with various actors, court sentences, regulations, and parliamentary proceedings. 
Reference to those documents is made in the analysis as applicable. Appendix 1 provides a list of public documents analyzed. 
4. The field of industrial relations in Spain 
To understand the social and political importance of industrial relations in Spain, it is informative to consider its history briefly, 
particularly in the 20th Century. In the 1920s, under the Primo de Rivera dictatorship, the union movement and industrial relations 
gained institutionalization through a collective bargaining system sponsored by the government in which the socialist union Unión 
General de Trabajadores participated, but not the anarchist unions, which were illegal. After the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), all 
unions, but the fascist one, were banned. However, over the years, the union movement infiltrated the fascist union and fought 
Franco’s dictatorship (1939–1975), emerging as a central building block for the transition in the seventies to a democratic system and 
the harmonization of Spain with other European countries (Redero San Román & Pérez Delgado, 1994). 
In this regard, industrial relations have transcended an economic/contractual perspective in Spain to have an essential social and 
political significance. Since the 1970s, workers’ rights have been considered a legitimate concern that needs to be balanced with 
concerns about economic efficiency. Employment and industrial relations are valued in Spain as an ingredient of a welfare state and a 
stable and advanced democracy, giving consideration to the employee-as-citizen as much as to the employee-as-producer. Industrial 
relations became a central matter in the configuration of citizenship in the 1978 Spanish Constitution, which mandated Parliament to 
legislate on the matter in the Estatuto de los Trabajadores (Workers’ Statute). Ever since the 1970s, social dialogue and consensus be-
tween government, employers and unions have carried strong legitimacy not only in industrial relations but in matters of general 
economic policy (Archel et al., 2011; Redero San Román & Pérez Delgado, 1994). In this regard, the government often calls most 
representative unions to negotiate (and confer with legitimacy) various industrial or economic policies. 
Language is never neutral, and a discussion about industrial relations is more apposite to unfolding the sociohistorical circumstances 
described above than a conversation about labor markets, which fits better the neoliberal discourses. For the sake of consistency, we use 
labor markets in this paper only for the discussion of neoliberal policies. Spanish industrial relations have been characterized by a 
governmental sponsoring of trade unions and a social dialogue system, with trade union presence being weaker at the workplace than at 
the centralized statewide, regional and sectoral areas of negotiation (López-Andreu, 2018). In particular, centralized collective bar-
gaining has allowed workers to be included in collective agreements in those places (e.g., small companies) where unionization is most 
challenging. As a result, between 1980 and 2010, it is estimated that about 80% of the workforce was covered in Spain by collective 
bargaining (Fernández Rodríguez et al., 2016). In contrast to governmental trade unions sponsoring and centralized collective bar-
gaining, trade union density (i.e., union members as a percentage of the workforce) has traditionally been below 20% in Spain, well 
P. Archel et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Critical Perspectives on Accounting xxx (xxxx) xxx
4
below other European countries.1 Finally, a crucial aspect of Spain’s industrial relations field is that every aspect, from union rep-
resentation to collective bargaining and working conditions, is regulated in detail and enforced by the labor courts. Spain is a notable 
exception in this regard, compared to other European countries, since only professional career judges can be part of labor courts2 
(Essenberg, 1986). In particular, two aspects meticulously regulated in Spain concern the protection against unfair dismissal and 
centralized collective bargaining (López-Andreu, 2018). 
4.1. The neoliberal agenda 
An extended role for unions and industrial relations is discordant with the neoliberal agenda. Institutions such as unions, collective 
bargaining, and employment protection are seen to impede individual and market liberty, preventing competition and the efficient 
allocation of resources by the labor market, according to neoliberal ideals (Smith, 2009). The belief that employment protection has 
detrimental consequences for the economy has motivated intergovernmental agencies to promote flexibilization policies that un-
dermine employment protection (Heyes & Lewis, 2014). In the last decades, different EU governments have sought to transform the 
industrial relations institutions and outcomes that characterize the European welfare state to increase competition and grant employer 
discretion in the job market (Baccaro & Howell, 2011). According to Baccaro and Howell (2011), institutional transformations consist 
in the elimination of barriers that previously limited capital’s discretion in the labor market: limiting the right to collective bargaining, 
fostering “unilateral employer decision making” (p. 527), or removing employment protection measures, among others. 
“Institutions of industrial relations have everywhere come to reduce the constraints—in the form of labor law or collective regu-
lation—acting on employers and thus to increase their ability to manage the workplace and their relationship with their employees as they 
please. The neoliberal trajectory that we observe finds its concrete form in this generalized expansion of employer discretion” (Baccaro & 
Howell, 2011, pp. 527-528). 
The Spanish regulation to protect employees against unfair dismissal and coordinate centralized collective bargaining is at odds 
with neoliberal ideals. Although industrial relations and labor law used to be considered in the European Union as a member state 
competence, the European Union has developed new policies to intervene more directly in domestic industrial relations regulation. For 
example, labor market flexibility has been one of the European Commission’s structural reforms (Hermann, 2017; Heyes & Lewis, 
2014). This is particularly the case for Mediterranean countries, where structural reforms in the labor market were imposed by the 
European Commission in the negotiations to bail out the banking sector after the 2008 global financial crisis (Fernández Rodríguez 
et al., 2016), including “the decentralization of bargaining, the facilitation of opt-outs from centralized collective bargaining agree-
ments and the limiting of wage increases to real productivity gains” (Cioffi & Dubin, 2016, p. 427). However, although these policies 
were imposed on different Mediterranean countries, Spain was particularly diligent in reforming its industrial relations, compared, for 
example, to Italy (Cioffi & Dubin, 2016; López-Andreu, 2018). 
5. Reforming the field in Spain 
Understanding the dynamics of the neoliberal reforms requires a consideration of the institutional frame in which they take place. 
The previous section described how the Spanish industrial relations field is meticulously regulated and how two key attributes of this 
field empower employees: judiciary protection and centralized collective bargaining. In contrast, this section describes how neoliberal 
reforms have gradually tried to strengthen the employer’s position and promote decentralized bargaining, i.e., at the company level. 
Deregulation of the labor market has often taken the form of “exceptions under certain circumstances from labor law or higher-level 
collective agreements” (Baccaro & Howell, 2011, p. 527). In the case of Spain, different reforms in the 1990s introduced in the 
legislation new objective causes for fair dismissal, including business’ losses and the need for a better organization of resources to 
preserve the company’s continuity and competitive position (Jurado Segovia, 2012; Montoya Melgar, 1997). Consequently, since the 
1990s, Spanish companies could adduce in court those objective causes to terminate or modify the labor contract. Different reforms 
gradually included economic, technical, organizational, or production objective causes. 
The 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent soaring unemployment rates in Spain provided the justification for further reforming 
industrial relations. It was ironically under a social-democratic government in 2010 (the Partido Socialista Obrero Español PSOE ruled 
between 2004 and 2011) that the neoliberal agenda made a substantial advance with the sixth reform of the labor market (Law 35/ 
2010) since the approval of the 1980 Workers’ Statute (Conde-Ruiz et al., 2011). This reform extended the objective causes for fair 
employment termination (Fernández Rodríguez et al., 2016). The initial text of the reform approved by the PSOE government and 
submitted to Parliament in June 2010 (Royal Decree 10/2010; Real Decreto-ley 10/2010) did not include any reference to the notion of 
forecasted losses (the events transforming the industrial relations field are displayed in the right-hand side of the vertical timeline in 
Fig. 1). However, the parliamentary validation of Royal Decree 10/2010 between June and September 2010 involved compromises 
with different political groups, with the consent of the Basque National Party (PNV) being decisive for the government to obtain a 
majority vote to move forward with the bill. Through a compromise amendment (number 185) submitted by PNV during the 
1 Data retrieved from ILOSTAT statistics on union membership at https://ilostat.ilo.org/topics/union-membership.  
2 Professional career judges appointed in labor courts amounted in 2019 to about 10% of the total professional career judges, according to the 
statistics of the Spanish General Council of the Judiciary https://www.poderjudicial.es/cgpj/es/Temas/Estadistica-Judicial/Estudios-e-Informes/ 
Justicia-Dato-a-Dato/ 
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parliamentary deliberation the provision on forecasted losses was included as an objective cause. PNV argued clumsily that forecasted 
losses provided more specific reasons and legal certainty to the regulation. The reform was finally approved through Law 35/2010 and 
resisted by trade unions, who organized a general strike on September 29, 2010, with no effect in the approved regulation. 
In essence, the reform in Law 35/2010 reduced dismissal costs, broadened objective causes, and allowed companies and employees 
to agree to opt out from centralized collective agreements (Fernández Rodríguez et al., 2016). 
While the 2010 labor reform was given to effect by a social-democratic government (PSOE), the Spanish people granted in the 2011 
elections an absolute parliamentary majority to the conservative Partido Popular (PP) that ruled from December 2011 until 2018. The 
conservative government submitted to Parliament in February 2012 a more uncompromising industrial relations reform (Royal Decree 
3/2012; Real Decreto-ley 3/2012), which was approved later under Law 3/2012 in July 2012, eliciting a general strike on March 29 this 
year. Fernández Rodríguez et al. (2016) consider that this reform fundamentally reshaped the balance of power in Spain’s industrial 
relations. It allowed the employer to introduce significant changes unilaterally, created new labor contracts without job security, and 
reduced the scope of centralized collective agreements. The 2012 reform also extended the application of forecasted losses as an 
objective cause for the employer to opt out unilaterally from centralized collective agreements. Cioffi and Dubin (2016) contend that the 
Spanish conservative government received particularly well the structural reforms championed by the European Commission to pursue 
its radical neoliberal labor agenda. 
In summary, two different governments, a social-democratic government in 2010 and a conservative government in 2012, modified 
industrial relations in Spain along the lines of a neoliberal program. If the 2010 reform broadened the objective causes for fair dismissal 
and allowed companies and employees to agree to opt out from centralized collective agreements, the 2012 reform eroded the workers’ 
position further. Both reforms instituted a new exception from labor law that eroded employment protection: the existence of fore-
casted losses could be presented as a reasonable cause for fair dismissal and, since 2012, for opting out from centralized collective 
Fig. 1. Reform and manifesto timeline. Source: our own elaboration.  
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agreements. 
6. Intellectual interventions in the forecasted losses case 
The use of an accounting artifact, i.e., the notion of forecasted losses, to transform the field of industrial relations and, singularly, 
the level of employment protection motivated a substantial group of Spanish accounting academics to sign two successive manifestos 
that the authors of this article promoted. This section outlines the rationale for the manifesto and the events surrounding this academic 
intervention. 
6.1. The rationale of the manifesto 
A substantial intellectual common ground could be found among Spanish accounting academics around the question of the ob-
jectivity and reliability of forecasted losses, as introduced in the legal reform. In that regard, the manifesto rationale is not by any 
means unconventional, with arguments that any accounting student or practitioner could identify. When writing the manifesto, it was 
critical to set the common ground around which forecasted losses in both reforms were deemed inappropriate. 
The manifesto succinctly expounded the differences between management accounting information and financial accounting in-
formation (Hemmer & Labro, 2008), paying particular attention to their contrasting characteristics to conclude that financial forecasts 
cannot be used to settle disputes between conflicting interests. The line of reasoning developed in the following paragraphs informed 
the manifesto, letters to members of Parliament, conversations with colleagues, press releases, the manifesto presentation, as well as a 
paper published in a Spanish professional accounting journal (Archel et al., 2012). 
On the one hand, management accounting systems encompass a set of techniques and processes of performance measurement, 
analysis, and control used to influence organizational members to implement business strategies (Anthony & Govindarajan, 2001; 
Ferreira & Otley, 2009). In that regard, it is a widely shared notion that management accounting systems are behavioral tools that 
reflect the company’s management goals. Among management accounting tools, budgeting systems translate the mission and business 
strategy into action plans, linking the long with the short term and bringing together the perspectives of different managers, raising 
awareness of the impact on collective results of actions in different areas (Libby & Lindsay, 2010). Budgeting involves decisions such as 
establishing specific targets, considering what is desirable and what is feasible, and the tension between imposition and participation. 
Budgeting is, in sum, closely linked to the company’s strategic goals, with any forecast being used as an instrument to influence the 
behavior of organizational members. This information is private, internal to the organization, and is rarely disclosed to the public. 
Finally, it is based on forecasts and hypotheses about the future of markets, performance, and desires of managers and shareholders. 
Auditing this information is problematic (Schelluch & Gay, 2006). 
Conversely, external financial information has significant distributive effects that concern managers, shareholders, employees, 
capital suppliers, and other stakeholders (Chiapello & Medjad, 2009). This information is regulated in the public interest to reduce 
information asymmetry by national and international accounting bodies (e.g., IASB, FASB, the European Union) to ensure that it meets 
the information needs of generic users, such as investors and employees, that are not in a position to demand tailored reports. For this 
reason, the financial accounting regulation sets some standards to ensure the relevance and reliability of such information, with 
reliability meaning that information is free from bias and errors (i.e., objective), something that is enforced by auditing (IFAC, 2011). 
Consequently, prospective information and opinions provided by management are excluded from the scope of the auditing activity (Ng 
et al., 2013). 
Accordingly, the manifesto argued that the field of industrial relations transcends the boundaries of organizations and management 
to occupy a public and social sphere, where structures and agents that are external to the organization (centralized collective bar-
gaining, trade unions, the courts, or the government) play a substantial role. Additionally, employment termination and collective 
bargaining are essentially conflictual activities in which the simple use of information has distributional consequences. In this context, 
it is not a surprise that the use of unaudited management financial projections could create several problems, including manipulation, 
never-ending debates about the soundness of specific forecasts, and legal uncertainty. 
6.2. Academic intervention: the 2010 and 2012 manifestos 
Previous accounting interventions reported in the literature consist of writing articles for magazines and newspapers (Neu et al., 
2001), the preparation of public reports (Cooper & Coulson, 2014), or the implementation of social accounting in organizations (Dey, 
2007). Unlike those experiences, based on specific cases, the intervention reported in this paper challenged the misuse of an accounting 
concept in policymaking in a field so sensitive as industrial relations. This intervention also involved a wide array of activities and 
strategies to engage with relevant actors in a country such as Spain, with the challenged policy potentially affecting millions of em-
ployees, thousands of businesses, and public officers, among others. The intellectuals engaging in this intervention adopted a proactive 
stance to reach the relevant actors, something that involved substantial effort from the academics’ side, apart from the pure intellectual 
one. 
The abovementioned PNV compromise amendment that included the reference to forecasted losses as an objective cause for fair 
dismissal was approved in a Parliament commission at the end of July 2010. Some conversations between accounting scholars and 
professionals emerged from that moment. However, it was not until early September that the authors of this paper decided to call 
Spanish accounting university academics to sign a manifesto (the actions taken in the academic intervention are displayed on the left- 
hand side of the vertical timeline in Fig. 1). This intervention involved proactive steps in catching the public attention. First, the 
P. Archel et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Critical Perspectives on Accounting xxx (xxxx) xxx
7
manifesto was shared with a short number of scholars to gain their initial support and lead the manifesto. Then, second, counting with 
the initial support of fourteen accounting scholars (including the authors), we initiated a signature petition addressed to all Spanish 
accounting academics, using formal and informal networks. Third, after about 150 academics signed the manifesto in a period of ten 
days, we proactively contacted journalists and senior union officers to share the information about the manifesto, although, in the 
meantime, the law was approved. Finally, the manifesto was presented in Madrid in November 2010. By then, the manifesto was 
signed by 182 scholars in total. 
While the inclusion of the forecasted losses exception in Spanish industrial relations came unexpectedly in 2010, this stimulated 
thinking, conversations, and a sense of the social significance of accounting, in such a way that when in February 2012, the conser-
vative government approved Royal Decree 3/2012, which extended this clause to the employer’s discretion to opt out from centralized 
collective agreements, accounting scholars had already a position. Although the 2010 academic arguments found a limited echo, we 
felt that a reform made by a new government deserved the confrontation with our arguments for reasons of consistency. Therefore, in 
February 2012, the authors of this paper agreed to draft a new manifesto and start a new signature petition, again addressed to all 
Spanish accounting academics. Two hundred and four accounting scholars had signed the manifesto in three weeks (the final number 
came to 207). This intervention was timelier compared to the previous one in that it was made well ahead of the Parliament debate and 
validation of the governmental Royal Decree (see Fig. 1). In that respect, the regulation could still be improved in Parliament. 
Therefore, we engaged in an active strategy to disseminate the ideas motivating the manifesto. As in the previous case, we proactively 
contacted journalists and senior union officers. We produced a paper published in the highest circulated professional journal in Spain 
at the time (Archel et al., 2012). We also wrote to members of the Parliament to share the concerns of the academic community. 
Finally, we engaged with labor law scholars and practitioners. In the end, despite all the arguments made, the conservative majority 
did not consider these academic concerns in the final approval of Law 3/2012. However, the intervention was not unsubstantial, and it 
is interesting to reflect on the encounters and struggles that it produced in the academic and industrial relations fields, as this could 
provide some insights into a more nuanced reality. 
7. Consequences of the reform and consequences of the intervention 
While the previous section described the intellectual foundation and the activities carried out as part of the intellectual in-
terventions, we now turn our attention to the field dynamics that resulted from the changes effected by the reforms and the inter-
vention of the accounting academics. Considering the importance of this study’s autoethnographic element, as explained in section 
three, part of this analysis consisted of conversations between the authors that are presented here through illustrative quotes extracted 
from our dialogues. 
7.1. Consequences of the field reform 
Fernández Rodríguez et al. (2016) have studied the changes produced by the Spanish labor law reforms and have found that the 
main effects are: a decline in the number of collective agreements and employees’ protection; a cut of salaries, and worsening of 
working conditions; and fragmentation and politicization of industrial relations. First, the number of employees covered by collective 
agreements has been curbed from 12 million in 2008 to 10.2 million in 2015,3 with a decline in the collective bargaining coverage rate 
from 81% in 2009 to 73% in 20164. Those figures are associated with the weakening of trade unions that the reforms have produced 
(Köhler & Calleja Jiménez, 2018), as demonstrated by trade union density, which further deteriorated in this period from 17.5 in 2009 
to 13.9 in 2015.5 
Second, Fernández Rodríguez et al. (2016) report a 10.4% decline in the average annual salary between 2011 and 2014 for Spanish 
employees, 18.2% for employees under 35. Overall, these figures translated into a declining labor share of income in Spain from 50.5% 
GDP in 2008 to 45.3 in 20166. The flexibility measures introduced in the reforms facilitated the absorption of the crisis by looming 
unemployment rates (from 8.2 in 2007 to 26.1 in 2013), spreading the risk from the margins of the labor markets to the previously 
unaffected core workers (López-Andreu, 2018), but still affecting substantially more young people with temporary contracts. 
Finally, the reforms produced fragmentation and politicization of industrial relations, with the more representative unions losing 
ground to more radical and politicized unions (Fernández Rodríguez et al., 2016, Köhler & Calleja Jiménez, 2018). In fact, despite a 
low and declining trade union density, the public perception of the role of trade unions in protecting workers remained solid and 
positive in Spain, with an increase from 60% to 73% support between 2005 and 2015, according to the International Social Survey 
Programme: Work Orientations (ISSP Research Group, 2013, ISSP Research Group, 2017). It is interesting to note that, according to the 
Eurobarometer (European Commission, 2018), such support in 2018 was more robust for Spaniards under 40 years and, particularly, 
under 25. Fernández Rodríguez et al. (2016) contend that proponents of the neoliberal agenda are simplistic and naïve concerning how 
industrial relations operate, paying no attention to their historical development (as outlined in previous sections). Being aware of the 
radicalization that the reform has produced, Fernández Rodríguez et al. (2016) report how part of the employers is increasingly willing 
3 Data retrieved from Ministerio de Trabajo y Economía Social statistics on collective bargaining at https://www.mites.gob.es/estadisticas/cct/ 
welcome.htm  
4 Data retrieved from ILOSTAT statistics on collective bargaining at https://ilostat.ilo.org/topics/collective-bargaining.  
5 Data retrieved from ILOSTAT statistics on union membership at https://ilostat.ilo.org/topics/union-membership.  
6 Data retrieved from the Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE) statistics on national disposable income at https://www.ine.es/. 
P. Archel et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Critical Perspectives on Accounting xxx (xxxx) xxx
8
to compromise with the traditional unions rather than taking full advantage of the prerogatives granted to employers by the new 
regulation. 
On different grounds, the economic causes of employment termination also created legal uncertainty, as judges find it difficult to 
assess the legal evidence stemming from economic figures and projections (Jurado Segovia, 2012). In Gutierrez-Solar Calvo’s opinion 
(2011), forecasted losses are difficult to refute because no reality objectively invalidates the argument presented by the company. We 
consulted different law students and practitioners who confirmed this problem, despite the legal requirement introduced in the 
development of the 2011 regulation to present before the court a technical report explaining the criteria used to estimate the forecasted 
losses. 
7.2. Academic reactions to the interventions 
The manifesto was a unique event in the Spanish accounting academia, signed by a sizable number of scholars. Signatories of the 
2012 manifesto included associate professors (39%), lecturers (18%), professors (14%), senior lecturers (10%), part-time instructors 
(10%), and other (9%), a distribution that reflects the structure of the academic staff of Spanish public universities.7 
As part of the collaborative autoethnography, we have discussed the role of individual academics and the accounting academia in 
the interventions. First, we found that the willingness to sign was shaped by different perceptions about the manifesto’s role with 
regard to the university’s mission. On the one hand, some people in academia did not think that this manifesto was an academic 
activity. In one of our universities, the academic secretary instructed the press office not to release any information about the manifesto 
on those grounds. Likewise, the Spanish accounting associations distributed the signature petitions, but they did so only at the end of 
their newsletters. They did not consider endorsing the manifesto either. One of us complained about the lack of structure to channel 
academic engagement: 
“And then, always, let’s say, whenever we [academic scholars] have engaged in [public policy], it was accidentally, there is no orga-
nization in any association that collectively creates working groups, nothing, zero.” 
On the other hand, further scholars understood that the manifesto was conducive to academic duty. There existed a sense of 
commonality of purpose that materialized in the support provided by about two hundred accounting academics. These were the 
recollections of one of us: 
“I think that was a little bit what happened at the time of the manifesto, that people, at least in conversations I had, were in favor of it, 
because they saw that professionally it was a very reasonable thing, and that accounting already had a lot to say on this subject.” 
There was a common ground in the academic community around the rationale of the manifesto explained in section six. In that 
regard, some conversations revealed that a part of the signatories could very well support the empowerment of the employer’s position 
(the reform’s aim), but not the employment of forecasted losses (one of the reform’s means) because it was inconsistent with concepts 
and values that pertained to the accounting discipline. 
Some positive academic values are certainly nurtured in a disciplinary environment: 
“Above all, I believe there is one very important thing, and that is feeling good about oneself, right? To think that you are doing the right 
thing. (…) Look, there are technicalities but this is also about something that is difficult to grasp, it is about feelings. It was about feelings, 
because we felt hurt when they talked about [the accounting discipline] with such frivolity.” 
Corroborating this association between signatures and academic duty (and refuting our expectations), individual academics’ po-
litical allegiances played a more volatile role in the willingness to sign; only a small number of colleagues changed their minds 
depending on the ruling political party. However, it is essential to bear in mind that there is still a tension between the academic duty 
and the intellectual discussions carried out in our comfortable ivory towers that too often keep us away from the conflicts and material 
necessities arising from, for example, industrial relations. 
Second, and quite unsurprisingly, we found that the intervention was conditioned by some external interferences in intellectual 
freedom and autonomy that Bourdieu would disapprove of. Interferences that inhibit any disposition to intervene beyond academia 
include those produced by administrative power, economic capital and, university factionalism. How bureaucratic research perfor-
mance measurement systems rather than intellectual competition increasingly affect academic careers (Picard et al., 2019) is a crucial 
administrative interference in intellectual freedom. As critical interventions are not considered in those systems, we think this 
Orwellian doublethink is creating an impediment for the standardized academic performer to sign the manifesto, which is progressively 
stronger. We are frustrated by this situation: 
“We are totally integrated in debates without any social relevance, when really, I believe that without doubt accounting has social 
relevance, then, we are locked in our world, now what? H-Index?” 
“There is a course in my university (…) very popular, in which they train [academics] to speak this language, how to build your 
curriculum, how to publish in journals, even if they are not [relevant for] your field… I’m amazed how they make you speak this 
language.” 
Economic interferences in academic freedom are ubiquitous, more so after the effects of the 2007 global financial crisis in Spanish 
7 Except for part-time instructors who are professional practitioners (e.g., auditors) and are underrepresented among the signatories. Data 
retrieved from the Ministry of Universities statistics on University Personnel Statistics at https://www.universidades.gob.es/portal/site/ 
universidades/. 
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public universities. While most accounting scholars to whom we addressed the signature petition were tenured, all were undoubtedly 
experiencing the consequences of austerity measures and deteriorating working conditions to a greater or lesser extent. In this situ-
ation, any intellectual intervention might be perceived as a luxury by tenured staff who see their salaries decrease and their workload 
augment and, especially, by untenured colleagues who suffer employment insecurity and are poorly organized. Although the authors 
are tenured, our conversations focused on the situation of untenured colleagues: 
“I put myself in their situation. Well, what do I have to do here to survive? It is survival, isn’t it? (…) it is to think, and tomorrow I might 
be on the dole. (…) [My concern is how] can I supplement the miserable salary (…) my last, let’s say, concern, right now is to commit to 
anything, but to commit to myself.” 
The paradox is that those who have better reasons to protest don’t fight (…) I don’t know, maybe they can see us, look at them, now they 
come to ask us…” 
Economic interferences could have discouraged the participation of some scholars. However, as mentioned above, the participation 
in this intervention by untenured accounting academics was similar to that of tenured scholars. In contrast, some tenured scholars 
showed their agreement with the manifesto rationale in personal conversations with us but did not come forward to sign it publicly 
because they understood this could undermine their professional opportunities inside or outside the university. 
Finally, something characteristic of Spanish academia, we also perceived that personal sympathies and allegiances played a sig-
nificant role in the decision (not) to sign the manifesto. 
“I think a lot of people act within those parameters, don’t you? Affinities or disagreements are more important than what we are talking 
about. That’s right. But, well, I think that happens in our discipline and in many others, right?” 
In sum, a substantial number of academics supported the manifesto mainly motivated by a shared sense of academic duty, although 
this view was not unanimous. Additionally, we could appreciate how bureaucracies, economic restrictions, and factionalism could 
have interfered in the disposition to participate in the intervention. 
7.3. Field effects of the interventions 
We now describe the dynamics that the intervention produced in the industrial relations field by reference to how different actors 
reacted to the manifesto. Concerning the media, the filtering effect to which Neu et al. (2001) refer operated to a limited extent in 
2010, considering the volume of accounting academics that signed the manifesto. It was covered by press agencies, two statewide and 
several local newspapers, and one of the authors was interviewed in the statewide public radio station. As it turned out, journalists 
were not active information seekers. Instead, we worked actively to make sure that the message arrived in the media and, still, our 
effort was unsuccessful in many cases. 
In contrast, the 2012 manifesto received a substantially lower coverage by the media but received more attention by what Neu et al. 
(2001) call the producers, those that can receive “technical, scientific and reasoned argument”, rather than “popular discourses and 
simple, digestible stories” (p. 756). The primary producers in this field are the legislators and judges that design and apply the new 
regulation. Already in 2011, the social-democratic Minister of Labor, Valeriano Gómez, conceded that it is not easy to determine the 
concept of forecasted losses (Cinco Días, 2011) and declared that his government was trying to avoid the easy way for collective layoffs 
that the reform created. They demanded a technical report attesting to the calculations prepared by a third independent expert, 
something inconsistent with the existing regulation. 
In 2012, in response to our communications, we received feedback from one senator and three Parliament members, including the 
former Minister of Labor, Valeriano Gómez. The conservative spokesperson in the Parliamentary committee dealing with the debate 
and validation of the Royal Decree was also aware of the manifesto. It should be taken into account that the 2012 manifesto was 
disclosed while the Royal Decree was still being validated in Parliament, and, therefore, there was still room for improvement in the 
lawmaking debates (see Fig. 1). We noted in our communications the existence of a clumsy contradiction between the Explanatory 
Memorandum and the actual articles of Royal Decree-Law 3/2012. Compared to the 2010 regulation, the memorandum stated that the 
new wording of the regulation removed “future projections, which are impossible to prove”, limiting the judicial consideration of the 
evidence to “an assessment of the concurrence of certain facts: the causes”. However, the relevant article did remove the previous 
byzantine provisions about business viability and competitiveness but did not eliminate the forecasted losses clause, furthering even 
more the employer’s position in industrial relations. 
In May 2012, we received a letter from the conservative Minister of Labor, Fátima Báñez, where she rebutted the 2012 manifesto on 
the grounds that, on the one hand, the new regulation did substantially not change the 2010 reform and, on the other hand: 
“the Council of State validates the use of this term in its decision (…). It merely points out that it would be more correct to refer to the case 
in which the alleged economic cause consists in forecasting losses rather than to forecasted losses, but does not outline any legal reproach 
for the use of such a concept” (Minister of Labor, letter 10/05/2012) 
Interestingly, while members of the Senate and the Parliament from both the conservative and the social-democratic parties reacted 
to the manifesto, we could not engage in any conversation with any representative of the leftist party (Izquierda Unida), despite our 
attempts by email and telephone. 
In sum, the accounting academics’ intervention caused some trouble but did not substantially affect the regulation itself. The 
Spanish Parliament did not invite any signatory of the manifesto, nor any other accounting scholar, to provide an expert opinion of the 
soundness of introducing such a concept in industrial relations regulation. 
However, as important as regulation is the daily practice in industrial relations and law application in labor courts. In that regard, 
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the publication of Archel et al. (2012) produced some sympathy in the judicature. For example, in personal communication, a senior 
magistrate expressed a sense of relief when he saw that a group of experts confirmed his opinion that forecasted losses could not be 
considered as facts as the legislator was pretending. The evaluation of such evidence was causing great concern in the courts, according 
to him. Several rulings also cited our professional paper for making precisely this point. Moreover, we need to stress that the opinion of 
those professional career judges is decisive since only they can integrate labor courts, and the reform implementation crucially depends 
on their interpretation of the law. 
Finally, considering that trade unions are relevant producers in this context, with interests aligned with the manifesto, we find 
remarkable our inability to engage in a conversation about our intervention with trade unions. We attempted to communicate with the 
most representative unions more formally by letter and informally by telephone and emails with no result whatsoever. 
8. Discussion and concluding comments 
This paper mobilizes Pierre Bourdieu’s ideas to inquire about the social and political potential of accounting scholarship, reflecting 
on the intellectual intervention of a Spanish group of accounting scholars. This reflection provides us the opportunity to present in a 
structured manner this engagement, which involved the challenge of the reform of Spanish industrial relations, in which accounting 
concepts played an unexpected role. By means of two reforms approved in 2010 and 2012, the notion of forecasted losses was 
introduced as an exception that limited employment protection against unfair dismissal and allowed employers to opt out from 
centralized collective agreements. The academic intervention took the form of two manifestos (led by the authors of this paper) signed 
by about two hundred Spanish accounting academics. 
Our experience in the intervention allowed us to analyze two different sets of dynamics. On the one hand, we could identify the 
forces at work in the accounting academic field, with habitus and disposition being key concerns. On the other hand, the intervention 
produced a confrontation between the academic and other fields, such as policymaking and industrial relations. Both questions are 
discussed now by reference to Bourdieu (2000a, 2000b). 
8.1. Intervention as scholastic disposition 
This paper is an exercise of reflexivity on our intervention. For Bourdieu, reflexivity is needed to recognize how the social sit-
uatedness of our academic disposition affects research (Swartz, 1997). These events provided us not only with a personal but also with 
a collective perspective. In that regard, in contrast with interventions reported in previous literature (Cooper and Coulson, 2014; Dey, 
2007; Neu et al., 2001), this intervention simultaneously involved a remarkable number of accounting scholars. 
While the very existence of a field requires actors who accept and believe (doxa) in the terms of the competition (illusio) in such a 
way that they have a disposition to invest in those fields (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Swartz, 1997), some interferences like narrow 
research evaluation, the propensity of Spanish academia towards factionalism, academic proletarianization, and professional ex-
pectations, shaped a somewhat distanced academic field, unwilling to engage in debates with other fields. First, the Spanish accounting 
academia is not alien to the global trends of research bureaucratization, research desingularization, and researchers dequalification 
(Picard et al., 2019). Those bureaucracies are fed and reproduced by scholars willing to participate in academic fields who need to 
follow the dictates of governmental agencies and journal rankings to survive. Research bureaucratization goes hand-in-hand with 
academic proletarianization, with every reform of the Spanish public university system introducing new low-paid academic profes-
sional categories and postponing tenure (Schwaller, 2019). Likewise, stepping forward was perceived by a few scholars as harmful for 
their actual or potential senior positions. Additionally, the reactions to the manifesto allowed us to reflect on how factionalism, and 
associated expectations about favors or retribution, have traditionally led Spanish scholars to carefully consider their allegiances and 
position in the academic field (Casanueva & Larrinaga, 2013). 
For Bourdieu, to exist in intellectual life is to differ, and scholars struggle for positions in the academic field with legitimate 
weapons consists of the respective contribution (Swartz, 2003). However, interferences from administrative and economic powers 
create heteronomous intellectual fields, in which bureaucrats (and not scholarly competition) determine the relative position of 
scholars. As a result, intellectual freedom and autonomy are limited, potentially hindering the willingness to intervene in exploring the 
political and social potential of accounting. 
On a more positive note, this intervention was a relative success in terms of accounting academic mobilization. In contrast with the 
concerns expressed in the literature (Haines-Doran, forthcoming; Neu et al., 2001), we could not find any sign of our cultural capital 
being attacked due to the manifesto. The misuse of an accounting concept with exogenous motivations to the accounting discipline 
produced discomfort among academics, an intellectual common ground, and a solid footing to this intervention. Moreover, rather than 
risking cultural capital, there was a sense that the intervention contributed to nurturing the accounting discipline. The disciplinary 
origins of our intervention served to protect the cultural capital and the autonomy of the accounting discipline (Bourdieu, 2000b) but 
stand in contrast with the critical accounting literature advocating assisting social movements from below (Catchpowle & Smyth, 
2016, Haines-Doran, forthcoming). Bourdieu thinks that the doxa and capitals are different in the academic field and the public arena 
and that academic freedom and autonomy are risked in academic interventions. 
8.2. Intervention as field struggle 
As has been previously explained, the manifesto was motivated by a belief that an accounting concept was misrepresented in the 
industrial relations field, with legal and social consequences. We argued that the use of unaudited management financial projections 
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paves the way for manipulation, never-ending debates about the soundness of those forecasts, and legal uncertainty. 
The notion of forecasted losses was introduced in the regulation in the context of a gradual transformation of industrial relations by 
removing barriers to capital’s discretion in the labor market. Intergovernmental agencies and, in particular, the European Union 
championed this transformation, which was resisted in different societies by trade unions and governments. In Bourdieu’s terms, we 
could interpret that those institutions mobilized their cultural, political, and economic capital to empower the employer’s position in 
industrial relations. However, this attempt was facing legitimacy problems, as workers and their representatives did not consent to 
their own domination. In different words, those institutions found it challenging to transform cultural, political, and economic capitals 
into symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 2000b; Swartz, 2003). 
Our interpretation is that the notion of forecasted losses plays the role of producing such transformation into symbolic capital. The 
reform broadened the objective causes for fair dismissal and allowed employers to opt out from centralized collective agreements in the 
event of forecasted losses. Proponents argued that making companies adaptable to the crisis could help to recover employment. 
Forecasted losses produced symbolic violence, disguising the empowerment of the employer’s position in objective causes for fair 
dismissal and in the intent to recover employment. In that regard, our intervention could be interpreted as aiming to expose the 
mechanisms of such symbolic violence (Bourdieu, 2000b; Swartz, 2003) by explaining how the notion of forecasted losses was mis-
represented in the reform. Upon reflection, we think that despite the abovementioned interferences in the academic field, the relative 
intervention’s appeal for accounting scholars was due to the simplicity of the message (in the eyes of accounting academics) and the 
absolute position. The clear standing of the manifesto also allowed the intervention to avoid the intellectual capture problems to 
reproduce symbolic violence, as identified by Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 2000b; Swartz, 2003). 
Field struggle is primarily a struggle over the relative value of different forms of capital. Intellectual capital is (or should be) the 
currency of intellectual fields, but its mobilization in different fields is problematic. In the context of academic interventions, Neu et al. 
(2001) distinguish between messages addressed to the consumers through the media that necessarily need to be digestible and 
messages addressed to the producers that can convey more technical and reasoned arguments, arguing that interventions need to 
produce the later kind of messages. This intervention consisted of two acts. First, the intervention in 2010 was untimely, and we tried 
to focus our energies on the media. The result was somewhat disappointing because the media coverage was limited. We were 
particularly surprised by the lack of attention given by actors that we anticipated would concur with our arguments, like trade unions 
or the leftist party Izquierda Unida. We can speculate that the intervention’s disciplinary genesis must have deterred unions from 
engaging in the conversation; a further explanation could be the lack of resources or the low trade union density. In any case, further 
research is needed to understand and foster the cooperation between accounting academics and trade unions in Spain. 
Second, the media coverage was minimal in 2012. However, over time, it was clear that some producers were voicing similar 
arguments (e.g., Minister Valeriano Gómez in 2011) or reacting to our arguments (Minister Fátima Báñez in 2012). Even more 
importantly was, as the reform moved forward, the impact that our “reasoned message” (Neu et al., 2001, p. 757) could have in the 
judicature in terms of presenting expert arguments in a professional article against the use of forecasted losses as evidence. While 
interventions reporting in the literature have focused on the use of accounting in specific decisions (Catchpowle & Smyth, 2016; 
Cooper & Coulson, 2014; Cooper et al., 2005; Haines-Doran, forthcoming; Neu et al., 2001), our intervention focused on the use of 
accounting in the law, with potential pervasive effects statewide. In this respect, engaging with the producers, rather than social 
movements, could be seen to have produced some effects. In that regard, we could find some court rulings that cited our professional 
article. Moreover, examining court rulings on the matter reveals that judges have interpreted forecasted losses restrictively, consid-
ering them as evidence only when accompanied by losses in previous fiscal years and by a reasonable justification of how the decision 
may affect business viability. That juridical practice has made the forecasted losses exception somewhat redundant, as previous losses 
and other potentially objective causes were already considered in the legislation and consequently limited its effect. 
Finally, the question about the intervention’s success can be answered by reference to the different fields. In the industrial relations 
field, the intervention could not have a direct effect (Neu et al., 2001). There were many forces at play in the reform of this field, and 
what our intervention could realistically do was provide rational arguments for the producers of this regulation. An indulgent 
interpretation is that the intervention provided arguments for the forecasted losses clause’s failure in practice. A strict interpretation is 
that the intervention did not stop introducing the forecasted losses exception for fair dismissal and opt-outs from centralized collective 
agreements. 
Nevertheless, despite the growing implication of accounting matters in regulation and policymaking, this intervention is unique in 
the Spanish accounting field. The participation of accounting academics in providing advice to policymakers is somewhat limited, 
something that calls for the accounting academics’ attention to engage in a broader and longer-term perspective, fostering different 
academic roles beyond the classroom and scientific journals. From our perspective, this is not the job of single academics but is every 
academic responsibility. As Garcia-Torea et al. (2019) contend, significant interventions can only take the form of long-term and 
collective engagements. 
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Appendix 1:. Selected public documents examined 
Consejo de Estado: Dictamen 389/2011. Proyecto de Real Decreto por el que se aprueba el Reglamento de los procedimientos de 
regulación de empleo y de actuación administrativa en materia de traslados colectivos. 14/04/2011. 
Ley 3/2012, de 6 de julio, de medidas urgentes para la reforma del mercado laboral. BOE núm. 162, de 7 de julio de 2012. 
Ley 35/2010, de 17 de septiembre, de medidas urgentes para la reforma del mercado de trabajo, BOE núm. 227, de 18 de sep-
tiembre de 2010. 
Manifiesto sobre pérdidas previstas 
Ministerio de la Presidencia, Enmiendas al Proyecto de Ley de medidas urgentes para la reforma del mercado de trabajo (proce-
dente del Real Decreto-Ley 10/2010, de 16 de junio. 
Real Decreto-ley 10/2010, de 16 de junio, de medidas urgentes para la reforma del mercado de trabajo. BOE núm. 147, de 17 de 
junio de 2010. 
Real Decreto-ley 3/2012, de 10 de febrero, de medidas urgentes para la reforma del mercado laboral. 
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